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Abstract
Here we address the criticism of our NAEP analyses by Rosenshine
(2003). On the basis of his thoughtful critique we redid some of the
analyses on which he focused. Our findings contradict his. This is no 
fault of his, the reasons for which are explained in this paper. Our
findings do support our position that high-stakes tests do not do
much to improve academic achievement. The extent to which states 
with high-stakes tests outperform states without high-stakes tests is,
at best, indeterminable. Using 1994-1998 NAEP reading and
1996-2000 NAEP math data and accounting for NAEP exemption
rates for the same years, we found that states with high-stakes tests
are not outperforming states without high-stakes tests in reading in
the 4th grade or math in the 8th grade at a statistically significant
level. States with high-stakes tests are, however, outperforming
states without high-stakes tests in math in the 4th grade at a
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statistically significant level. Our findings also support our earlier
stance that states with high-stakes tests are exempting more
students from participating in the NAEP than are states without
high-stakes tests. This is more prevalent the more recent the NAEP
test administration. This is illustrated in the tables below.
Introduction
In our research, we were concerned that scores on high-stakes state tests could
easily be manipulated through narrowing of the curriculum, drilling on items similar
to the test, increasing exclusion rates of students, increasing in dropouts and
push-outs, and the like. To judge whether that concern was valid, we looked at
audit tests—tests that might have some overlap with a state’s own test but where
school personnel were under much less intense pressure to achieve higher scores.
We chose a series of audit tests to examine—SAT, ACT and AP tests, as well as
all administrations of the NAEP reading and mathematics tests. We also studied
whether some unanticipated side effects were present when high-stakes tests were
introduced, such as increased GED taking, increased reporting of cheating,
problems of teacher morale, problems with student motivation to learn, and so
forth.
Substantive criticism of our work, thus far, has been limited to the NAEP data we
reported. To our knowledge, the other conclusions we reached have not yet been
subject to the same kinds of thoughtful criticism. So for now, given the methods that
we used for analyses, our findings in those other areas stand. We concluded that
there was no systematic pattern of gains on SATs, ACTs or AP exams. That is, we
found no evidence of transfer from the state tests to these other tests, tests that
can be considered as audit measures. In addition, we found increased drop-out
rates and decreased high school graduation rates, increased rates by which
students participated in the GED program, and a host of troubling negative affects
associated with high-stakes testing.
Here we address the criticism of our NAEP analyses by Rosenshine (2003). On the
basis of his thoughtful criticism, we redid some of the analyses on which he
focused and now have a different view of the findings. What we found contradicts
what we found in both of our earlier papers (Amrein & Berliner, 2002a; Amrein &
Berliner 2002b) but the data analyzed below are for different years of data from
those used in the earlier papers. Following the form of the analyses done by
Rosenshine the data analyzed below are only for the years 1994-1998 for the
NAEP reading test, and 1996-2000 for the NAEP mathematics tests. In addition, in
our earlier work we used the national trend line as the contrast or control group for
our analyses. In this analysis, we use the composite score for states without
high-stakes tests as the control. In addition, our findings contradict the findings
reported by Rosenshine. This is no fault of his. Rosenshine used our designation of
clear and unclear states with and without high-stakes tests from the second of our
two papers.[2] We communicated many times and approved the states he used in
his analysis. Given more consideration, however, we noticed the distinctions we
made between clear and unclear states was based on our overall findings which
were based on all of the available NAEP data. In other words, Rosenshine
analyzed the latest two NAEP administrations in reading and math using the
3 of 16
distinctions we made between clear and unclear states when we used all of the
available NAEP data, approximately 10 years of NAEP data per subject. To
complicate things more, because we used the national trend line as our control
group, our clear/unclear distinctions were also made factoring in the national
average. Rosenshine did not do this which makes for differences in the findings. He
used the states without high-stakes tests as the control. This makes for a better
analysis and we have followed his lead here. In short, Rosenshine should not be
faulted for his findings nor should he be considered wrong in what he did. He did a
fine reanalysis of our NAEP examination given the information he had at that point,
and here we are redoing his.
NAEP Reading Grade 4 1994-1998
Taking Table 1 from Amrein & Berliner (2002b) and the states in which high stakes
tests were implemented before 1994 and between 1994 and 1998, we re-ran our
analyses, as Rosenshine did, using all states with high-stakes tests and, as the
control group, all states without high-stakes tests for which NAEP data were
available. What we found in regards to reading grade 4 achievement from
1994-1998 is as follows:
Table 1
Fourth grade 1994-1998 NAEP reading scores (raw data).
States without 
high-stakes 
tests:
NAEP 
1994
NAEP 
1998
States with
high-stakes 
tests:
NAEP 
1994
NAEP 
1998
Arizona 206 207 Alabama 208 211
Arkansas 209 209 Kentucky 212 218
California 197 202 Louisiana 197 204
Colorado 213 222 Maryland 210 215
Connecticut 222 232 Michigan n/a 217
Delaware 206 212 Mississippi 202 204
Florida 205 207 Missouri 217 216
Georgia 207 210
New 
Mexico 205 206
Hawaii 201 200
North 
Carolina 214 217
Iowa 223 223 Oklahoma n/a 220
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Kansas n/a 222
South 
Carolina 203 210
Maine 228 225 Tennessee 213 212
Massachusetts 223 225 Texas 212 217
Minnesota 218 222
West 
Virginia 213 216
Montana 222 226
Nevada n/a 208
New 
Hampshire 223 226
New York 212 216
Oregon n/a 214
Rhode Island 220 218
Utah 217 215
Virginia 213 218
Washington 213 217
Wisconsin 224 224
Change 
in Score
Change 
in Score
Wyoming 221 219
OVERALL 214.7 216.8 +2.1* OVERALL 208.8 213.1 +4.3*
*Significant at a p < .05 level
Table 1 illustrates that the states with high-stakes tests outperformed those states
without high-stakes tests on the NAEP grade 4 reading tests over the period
1994-1998. However, as shown in our earlier research (Amrein & Berliner, 2002a;
Amrein & Berliner, 2002b), the rates by which students are excluded from the
NAEP must be taken into consideration to determine whether gains and losses are
clear (interpretable) or unclear (not interpretable).
Clear gains can be determined if a state’s scores increase while the rates by which
students are exempted from the NAEP stay the same or decrease. In other words,
when the pool of students sampled to participate in the NAEP is less selective then
the likelihood that their scores would increase artificially is nullified. Under these
conditions such gains are clear. Clear losses can be determined if a state’s scores
decrease at the same time the rates by which students are exempted from the
NAEP increase. In this case, the pool of students sampled was more selective and
yet the scores still went down. Under these conditions it is reasonable to interpret
those findings as a clear loss.
Unclear gains are the case when a state’s scores increase while the rates by which
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students are exempted from the NAEP increase. In other words, the pool of
students sampled to participate in the NAEP is more selective and therefore likely
to have biased the resulting gains. If lower-scoring students are pulled from the
NAEP sample, scores on the NAEP will increase. This makes for unclear results.
Unclear losses are the case when a state’s scores decrease at the same time the
rates by which students are exempted from the NAEP sample decrease. In this
case, the pool of students sampled was less selective so it is difficult to determine
whether the addition of more lower-scoring students or an actual decrease in
achievement caused the resulting losses.
We believe that it is absolutely necessary to make these kinds of judgments about
each state because states with high-stakes tests are those states that increasingly
are exempting more students from participating in the NAEP. “In states with
high-stakes tests, between 0%–49% of the gains in NAEP scores can be explained
by increases in rates of exclusion.” (Amrein & Berliner, 2002a)
Looking simply at those states for which clear gains or losses are applicable, an
analysis of the data yields the results given in Table 2. In this table states shaded in
green are those for which clear results were evident, states shaded in red are those
for which unclear results were illustrated, and states shaded in yellow are those for
which there were not enough data to analyze gains or losses appropriately.
As can be seen, only two states included in the states with high-stakes column can
be counted as states with “clear” effects. The composite data are not significant but
the table illustrates the extent to which states with high-stakes tests are not gaining
in score simply because of their high-stakes testing policies.
Table 2
Fourth grade 1994-1998 NAEP reading scores with states coded as
clear or unclear in their gains and losses.
States without 
high-stakes 
tests:
NAEP 
1994
NAEP 
1998
States with
high-stakes 
tests:
NAEP 
1994
NAEP 
1998
Arizona 206 207 Alabama 208 211
Arkansas 209 209 Kentucky 212 218
California 197 202 Louisiana 197 204
Colorado 213 222 Maryland 210 215
Connecticut 222 232 Michigan n/a 217
Delaware 206 212 Mississippi 202 204
Florida 205 207 Missouri 217 216
Georgia 207 210
New 
Mexico 205 206
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Hawaii 201 200
North 
Carolina 214 217
Iowa 223 223 Oklahoma n/a 220
Kansas n/a 222
South 
Carolina 203 210
Maine 228 225 Tennessee 213 212
Massachusetts 223 225 Texas 212 217
Minnesota 218 222
West 
Virginia 213 216
Montana 222 226
Nevada n/a 208
New 
Hampshire 223 226
New York 212 216
Oregon n/a 214
Rhode Island 220 218
Utah 217 215
Virginia 213 218
Washington 213 217
Wisconsin 224 224
Change 
in Score
Change 
in Score
Wyoming 221 219
OVERALL 215.4 217.0 +1.6* OVERALL 209.5 210.0 +0.5
*Significant at a p < .05 level
The composite data are important in that they nullify what one might conclude
looking simply at Table 1. States with high-stakes tests are not outperforming
states without high-stakes tests in reading grade 4 performance. Rather, as
illustrated in Table 2, states without high-stakes tests gained in reading grade 4
performance at a statistically significant level. Given only two states are included as
clear states with high-stakes tests, states with high-stakes tests made insignificant
gains and the differences between the two mean gains are not statistically
significant.
Most importantly, what can be drawn from Table 2 is that states with high-stakes
tests are exempting more students from participating in the reading grade 4 NAEP.
Ninety percent of the states with “unclear” gains are states with increases in the
rates by which students were exempted from the test. This supports the notion that
states with high-stakes tests are not gaining in NAEP scores simply because of
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their high-stakes testing policies.
NAEP Math Grade 4 1996-2000
Taking Table 1 from Amrein & Berliner (2002b) and the states in which high stakes
tests were implemented before 1996 and between 1996 and 2000, we re-ran our
analyses using all states with high-stakes tests and, as the control group, all states
without high-stakes tests for which NAEP data were available. What we found in
regards to math grade 4 achievement from 1996-2000 is as follows:
Table 3
Fourth grade 1996-2000 NAEP mathematics scores (raw data)
States 
without 
high-stakes 
tests:
NAEP 
1996
NAEP 
2000
States with
high-stakes 
tests:
NAEP 
1996
NAEP 
2000
Alaska 224 n/a Alabama 212 218
Arizona 218 219 California 209 214
Arkansas 216 217 Delaware 215 n/a
Colorado 226 n/a Florida 216 n/a
Connecticut 232 234 Indiana 229 234
Georgia 216 220 Kentucky 220 221
Hawaii 215 216 Louisiana 209 218
Idaho n/a 227 Maryland 220 222
Illinois n/a 225 Massachusetts 229 235
Iowa 229 233 Michigan 226 231
Kansas n/a 232 Mississippi 208 211
Maine 233 231 Missouri 225 229
Minnesota 232 235 Nevada 217 220
Montana 228 230 New Jersey 227 n/a
Nebraska 228 226 New Mexico 214 214
North 
Dakota 231 231 New York 223 227
Oregon 224 227 North Carolina 224 232
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Rhode 
Island 221 225 Ohio n/a 231
Tennessee 219 220 Oklahoma n/a 225
Utah 226 227 Pennsylvania 226 n/a
Vermont 225 232 South Carolina 213 220
Washington 225 n/a Texas 229 233
Wisconsin 231 n/a
Change 
in Score
Virginia 222 230 Change 
in 
ScoreWyoming 223 229 West Virginia 224 225
OVERALL 224.9 226.8 +1.9* OVERALL 219.9 224.5 +4.6*
*Significant at a p < .05 level
Table 3 illustrates that the states with high-stakes tests outperformed those states
without high-stakes tests on the math NAEP grade 4 tests over the time period
1996-2000. However, as argued earlier, the rates by which students are excluded
from the NAEP must be taken into consideration to determine whether gains and
losses are clear or unclear. Using the same rules as outlined above to determine
clear and unclear gains and losses, we looked at only those states for which clear
gains or losses are relevant. (For 4th grade reading, Rosenshine included the
following states: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. There are notable differences in the states he included and the states
we included that likely came from the fact that we drew our states directly out of
Table 1 of the original document.) An analysis of the data yields the following:
Table 4
Fourth grade 1996-2000 NAEP mathematics scores with states
coded as clear or unclear in their gains and losses.
States 
without 
high-stakes 
tests:
NAEP 
1996
NAEP 
2000
States with
high-stakes 
tests:
NAEP 
1996
NAEP 
2000
Alaska 224 n/a Alabama 212 218
Arizona 218 219 California 209 214
Arkansas 216 217 Delaware 215 n/a
Colorado 226 n/a Florida 216 n/a
Connecticut 232 234 Indiana 229 234
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Georgia 216 220 Kentucky 220 221
Hawaii 215 216 Louisiana 209 218
Idaho n/a 227 Maryland 220 222
Illinois n/a 225 Massachusetts 229 235
Iowa 229 233 Michigan 226 231
Kansas n/a 232 Mississippi 208 211
Maine 233 231 Missouri 225 229
Minnesota 232 235 Nevada 217 220
Montana 228 230 New Jersey 227 n/a
Nebraska 228 226 New Mexico 214 214
North 
Dakota 231 231 New York 223 227
Oregon 224 227 North Carolina 224 232
Rhode 
Island 221 225 Ohio n/a 231
Tennessee 219 220 Oklahoma n/a 225
Utah 226 227 Pennsylvania 226 n/a
Vermont 225 232 South Carolina 213 220
Washington 225 n/a Texas 229 233
Wisconsin 231 n/a
Change 
in Score
Virginia 222 230 Change 
in 
ScoreWyoming 223 229 West Virginia 224 225
OVERALL 224.5 225.6 +1.1 OVERALL 210.4 215.0 +4.6*
*Significant at a p < .05 level
Compared to the reading data above, we now find the opposite when we look at the
math grade 4 NAEP composite data. When states with clear effects are pulled out
and analyzed, it is apparent that states with high-stakes tests are outperforming
states without high-stakes tests at a statistically significant level. The scores posted
by the clear states with high-stakes tests are significantly different than the scores
posted by the clear states without high-stakes tests.
Again, however, what can also be drawn from Table 4 is that states with
high-stakes tests are exempting more students from participating in the math grade
4 NAEP. Two times as many states with high-stakes tests exempted students and
realized gains in grade 4 math achievement from 1996-2000 than did states without
high-stakes tests. This, again, supports the notion that states with high-stakes tests
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are not all gaining in NAEP scores simply because of their high-stakes testing
policies.
NAEP Math Grade 8 1996-2000
Taking Table 1 from Amrein & Berliner (2002b) and the states in which high stakes
tests were implemented before 1996 and between 1996 and 2000, we re-ran our
analyses using all states with high-stakes tests and, as the control group, all states
without high-stakes tests for which NAEP data were available. What we found in
regards to math grade 8 achievement from 1996-2000 is as follows:
Table 5
Eighth grade 1996-2000 NAEP mathematics scores (raw data)
States 
without 
high-stakes 
tests:
NAEP 
1996
NAEP 
2000
States with
high-stakes 
tests:
NAEP 
1996
NAEP 
2000
Alaska 278 n/a Alabama 256 262
Arizona 268 271 California 263 262
Arkansas 261 261 Delaware 267 n/a
Colorado 276 n/a Florida 264 n/a
Connecticut 280 282 Indiana 275 283
Georgia 262 266 Kentucky 267 272
Hawaii 262 263 Louisiana 252 259
Idaho n/a 278 Maryland 270 276
Illinois n/a 277 Massachusetts 277 283
Iowa 284 n/a Michigan 276 278
Kansas n/a 284 Mississippi 250 254
Maine 284 284 Missouri 274 274
Minnesota 284 288 Nevada n/a 268
Montana 283 287 New Mexico 262 260
Nebraska 283 281 New York 270 276
North 
Dakota 284 283 North Carolina 268 280
Oregon 277 281 Ohio n/a 283
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Rhode 
Island 268 273 Oklahoma n/a 272
Tennessee 263 263 South Carolina 260 266
Utah 276 275 Texas 270 275
Vermont 279 283 Virginia 270 277
Washington 276 n/a West Virginia 265 271
Wisconsin 283 n/a
Change 
in Score
Change 
in 
ScoreWyoming 275 277
OVERALL 275.5 276.7 +1.2* OVERALL 266.1 271.6 +5.4*
*Significant at a p < .05 level
Table 5 illustrates the states with high-stakes tests outperformed those states
without high-stakes tests on the math NAEP grade 8 1996-2000. Again, we argue
that the rates by which students are excluded from the NAEP must be taken into
consideration to determine whether gains and losses are clear or unclear.
Using the same rules as outlined above to determine clear and unclear gains and
losses, we looked at only those states for which clear gains or losses are apparent
(Note 3). An analysis of the data yields the following:
Table 6
Eighth grade 1996-2000 NAEP mathematics scores with states
coded as clear or unclear in their gains and losses.
States 
without 
high-stakes 
tests
NAEP 
1996
NAEP 
2000
States with
high-stakes 
tests
NAEP 
1996
NAEP 
2000
Alaska 278 n/a Alabama 256 262
Arizona 268 271 California 263 262
Arkansas 261 261 Delaware 267 n/a
Colorado 276 n/a Florida 264 n/a
Connecticut 280 282 Indiana 275 283
Georgia 262 266 Kentucky 267 272
Hawaii 262 263 Louisiana 252 259
Idaho n/a 278 Maryland 270 276
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Illinois n/a 277 Massachusetts 277 283
Iowa 284 n/a Michigan 276 278
Kansas n/a 284 Mississippi 250 254
Maine 284 284 Missouri 274 274
Minnesota 284 288 Nevada n/a 268
Montana 283 287 New Mexico 262 260
Nebraska 283 281 New York 270 276
North 
Dakota 284 283 North Carolina 268 280
Oregon 277 281 Ohio n/a 283
Rhode 
Island 268 273 Oklahoma n/a 272
Tennessee 263 263 South Carolina 260 266
Utah 276 275 Texas 270 275
Vermont 279 283 Virginia 270 277
Washington 276 n/a West Virginia 265 271
Wisconsin 283 n/a
Change 
in Score
Change 
in 
ScoreWyoming 275 277
OVERALL 271.1 271.9 +0.7 OVERALL 258.8 261.8 +3.0
After the states with clear effects are pulled out and analyzed, it seems that states
with high-stakes tests are outperforming states without high-stakes tests. They are
not, however, outperforming states without high-stakes tests at a statistically
significant level. In addition, the scores posted by the clear states with high-stakes
tests are not significantly different than the scores posted by the clear states
without high-stakes tests. States with high-stakes tests are not outperforming states
without high-stakes tests in math grade 8 performance.
Again, what can also be drawn from Table 6 is that states with high-stakes tests are
exempting more students from participating in the math grade 8 NAEP. Thirty-three
percent of the states without high-stakes tests exempted more students and
realized gains in math grade 8 NAEP scores. Fifty percent of the states with
high-stakes tests exempted more students and realized gains in math grade 8
NAEP scores. This, again, supports our assertion that states with high-stakes tests
are not gaining in NAEP scores simply because of their high-stakes testing policies.
Conclusion
In short, states with high-stakes tests seem to have outperformed states without
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high-stakes tests on the grade 4 math NAEP at a statistically significant level.
However, gains between states with and without high stakes tests were not
statistically different on the grade 4 reading or the grade 8 math NAEP. States with
high-stakes tests are not outperforming states without high-stakes tests on both of
these measures.
In addition, the rates by which personnel in states with high-stakes tests are
exempting students are increasing at a faster rate than they are in states without
high-stakes tests. There may be an underlying characteristic other than high-stakes
tests that is causing this phenomenon, but this would take further analyses. What
we do know, however, is that for the most part the gains posted by states with
high-stakes tests on two of the three NAEP tests are more related to the rates by
which students are exempted from the tests than they are related to high-stakes
tests themselves.
We thank Professor Rosenshine for suggesting these alternative analytic
techniques to us. In the end, for now, we remain unconvinced that the NAEP tests
are showing much in the way of transfer effects. Given all the data we reported in
our previous reports we remain unconvinced that the high-stakes tests used by
states are showing systematic positive affects on audit tests used to assess
transfer.
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